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Abstract
This article analyses how reputation functions as a mechanism for social
control in private and public regulation. It discusses three cases of private
markets where reputation is a powerful and effective mechanism for social
control. From the case studies, four characteristics of markets with effective
reputational sanctions are identified. Reputational sanctioning is not limited
to the private sphere. More and more, public regulators are disclosing names
of sanctioned companies or experimenting with naming and shaming, in the
expectation that this will enhance the impact of their enforcement strategies
on compliance. However, this article argues that the conditions that
contribute to the strength of reputation as a regulatory mechanism in private
markets are often absent in public regulation.
1 Introduction
Many commercial markets are characterised by long-term cooperation,
informal relationships and high levels of mutual trust. In these markets,
upholding a reputation of trustworthiness is crucial for successful business
performance. When an entrepreneur does not keep his promises or fails to
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compensate for a broken agreement, he will not be granted deals in the
future. A reputation of reliability thus enhances the chance of future deals.
Therefore, reputation can be considered a form of capital, even more
important than a company’s financial capital. After all, financial capital can
be regained, but it is much more difficult do rebuild a reputation that has
been damaged. In these markets, the prospect that broken agreements will
result in reputational damage is enough to ensure compliance to contractual
agreements. Therefore, law is not the most important mechanism to
influence and control corporate behavior.1 On the contrary, compliance to
the obligations of parties, whether or not they are written down in contracts,
is enforced through out-of-court mechanisms of social control. In other
words, entrepreneurs keep their promises not because they fear being sued,
but because they fear developing a bad reputation.2 As this article will show,
there are even markets in which reputational regulation is so powerful and
efficient that legal conflict resolution is virtually nonexistent.
The first aim of this article is to explore the way in which reputation
functions as a mechanism of social control. What characterizes markets
where reputation is an effective regulatory mechanism? How is information
about reputations exchanged and what do reputational sanctions consist of?
What mechanisms and conditions underlie the effectiveness of reputational
sanctions in business relations? More insight into the functioning of
reputation regulation is not only important for a better understanding of
markets, it is also highly relevant for the public regulation of corporate
behaviour in markets. More and more, public regulators are trying to
incorporate reputational mechanisms in public regulation, using reputational
sanctioning as an instrument of public policy.3 Public disclosure of corporate
offenders, or naming and shaming, is gaining popularity as a regulatory tool.
In many European countries, regulators are experimenting with the public
disclosure of inspection results, offender indexes, or shaming offenders in
the media. Of course, press releases or public notices following incidents
have long been practice. What is new is the systematic and detailed character
of the information published, as with the disclosure of all names and
1 D. Black (ed.), Toward a general theory of social control, vol. 1: Fundamentals
(Orlando: Academic Press 1984), R.C. Ellickson, Order without law, How
neighbors settle disputes (Cambridge: Harvard University Press 1991).
2 E. Posner, Law and Social Norms (Cambridge: Harvard University Press 2000) at
12.
3 D. Kahan and E. Posner, ‘Shaming White Collar criminals: a proposal for reform
of the federal sentencing guidelines’ (1999) 42 Journal of Law and Economics at
365. J.G. van Erp, ’De dreiging van negatieve publiciteit: Is reputatieschade een
alternatief voor handhaving?’ in F. Leeuw, J. Kerseboom and R. Elte (eds.), Turven,
Tellen, Toetsen, Over toezicht, inspectie, handhaving en evaluatie en hun
maatschappelijke betekenis in Nederland (Den Haag: Boom Juridische Uitgevers
2007) 79.
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offences of violating companies in a public register or on a blacklist. Here
are some examples:
 The British Health and Safety Executive keeps a public register of
convictions, where an overview of convicted companies can be found.
 The Dutch Authority for Financial Markets (AFM) issues warning lists
with the names of companies that offer securities services without the
required license. The AFM informs the public that these companies are
infracting the law and ‘strongly advises’ investors not to do business
with these companies.
 The European Directive on public access to environmental information
obliges member states to publish names of polluting companies in the
European Pollutant Emission Register.
 The European Commission has established a public list of airlines
considered to be unsafe and therefore not allowed to carry passengers or
cargo within European airspace.
 Both in Denmark and in the UK, ‘scores on the doors’ of restaurants
show the extent to which the restaurant complies with hygiene standards.
A positive smiley denotes compliance, a negative smiley indicates
discrepancies.
The academic evaluation of the effectiveness of naming and shaming
as a policy instrument has not kept up with its increasing use. Therefore, the
second aim of this article is to draw lessons from successful reputational
regulation in private markets, for public regulation. Understanding the
strengths and weaknesses of reputational mechanisms in non-legal settings
can help us understand whether, and when, reputational sanctions can be
successfully used as part of governmental social control. In what
circumstances can legal and reputational sanctions reinforce each other, and
can reputational sanctions that are initiated by governments be just as
powerful as reputational sanctions in markets?
To answer these questions, I will present three cases of successful
reputational regulation in commercial markets (section 2): the market for
Cotton in the American South;4 the diamond trade in New York,5 and the
Dutch construction industry.6 These cases were chosen because of the
detailed insight they provide into the working of reputational mechanisms.
4 L. Bernstein, ‘Private commercial law in the cotton industry: creating cooperation
through rules, norms, and institutions’ (2001) 99 Michigan Law Review 1724.
5 B.D. Richman, ‘How community institutions create economic advantage: Jewish
diamond merchants in New York’ (2006) 31 Law & Social Inquiry 383.
6 H. van de Bunt, ‘Rekeningen vereffenen in de bouw’(2008) 50 Tijdschrift voor
Criminologie 130.
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Despite the fact that the authors originate from different theoretical
backgrounds – law and economics, law and sociology, and criminology
respectively – the case descriptions have several characteristics in common.
All three cases are examples of situations that are very vulnerable to
conflicts, but where legal regulation is either considered undesirable or is
unavailable. In the case of the market for cotton, the volatile nature of the
merchandise calls for a strong mechanism for conflict prevention, whereas
legal dispute settlement provides an ex post solution. The same goes for the
diamond market, where traders need to entrust their precious stones to
potential buyers without receiving advance payment or formal security. The
third case deals with the Dutch construction industry, which was involved in
a market-wide cartel for many years. In this case, the illegal nature of the
cartels makes it impossible to settle conflicts via a legal procedure. In all
three cases, reputational sanctions function as mechanisms of social control
that is so effective that markets flourish without any legal backup.
On the basis of these cases, I will identify characteristics of markets
with successful reputational regulation (section 3). Finally, I will analyse the
extent to which situations where public regulators disclose reputational
information about offenders, or attempt to name and shame, correspond to
these characteristics (section 4). In other words, I will ask the question
whether the conditions that account for the effectiveness of reputational
sanctions in commercial markets are present in public regulation. The article
ends with a brief conclusion.
2 Effective reputational social control: three examples
2.1 The Cotton trade in the American South7
For many years, the city of Memphis in the American South has been the
centre of the cotton trade. The cotton trade provides us with an example of a
market where traditional forms of social control have been able to survive by
adapting to modern times. Information about traders’ reputations are
exchanged through both formal and informal communication channels,
providing knowledge about traders’ past behaviour to third parties without
their personally experiencing this behaviour.
7 For a further analysis of this case, see Bernstein, above n. 4 and J.G. van Erp,
‘Naming en Shaming in het contractenrecht? Het reputatie-effect van
schadevergoedingen tussen ondernemingen’ in W. van Boom, I. Giesen and A.
Verheij (eds.), Gedrag en Privaatrecht, over gedragspresumpties en gedragseffecten
bij privaatrechtelijke vraagstukken (Den Haag: Boom Juridische Uitgevers 2008)
153.
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Trust is a defining characteristic of the American cotton trade. The
highly volatile prices and quality of cotton and the difficulty of judging that
quality beforehand is the reason for this. Deals, even if worth millions of
dollars, are made face to face or by telephone, and only later does the buyer
actually assess the quality of the merchandise. Agreements are only
documented for tax or customs reasons. Because of these characteristics of
the cotton trade, it is crucial that cotton traders have a reputation of
trustworthiness on the subject of timely delivery and payment; flexibility;
and quality-price assessment. As a trader explains,
You want to do business where you know people and can depend on what they say
on quality, since it is so subtle and so subjective. You are more likely to rely on
quality when you know the guy.8
To cotton traders, commercial and tort law are not suitable mechanisms for
enforcing compliance with agreements. For most traders, obtaining
compensation for damages through a court procedure is not a very
comforting scenario. Litigation is costly, insecure and complex and business
people generally want to prevent problems from occurring instead of
remedying them afterwards. Compensation of damages is not an effective
sanction because it does not adequately prevent conflicts. Instead, it simply
puts a price on non-compliance.9
To ensure that agreements are complied with, cotton traders choose
trading partners with a reputation of reliability. The cotton market is
generally characterised by long-term, cooperative relations. However, the
market is too complex for traders to be fully informed about all interactions
of their business partners. This calls for a network in which reputation
information can be exchanged. The various cotton trade associations provide
this information by actively registering and disclosing information about the
traders’ reliability. The American Cotton Shippers Association, for example,
keeps a register of breaches of contract and is authorised to inform a
potential trade partner confidentially on the reliability of a trader on request.
Membership of a trade association generally requires breaches of contracts
of business partners to be reported, to ensure the association has complete
and up-to-date information. Names of traders that have broken promises are
published in a newsletter. Serious offenders are suspended or expelled from
the trade association, making it impossible for them to participate in the
trade. Finally, an active trade press and specialised commercial banks
contribute to the distribution of information on the reliability of traders.
8 Bernstein, above n. 4 at 1746.
9 J.S. Johnston, ‘Should the Law Ignore Commercial Norms? A Comment on the
Bernstein Conjecture and Its Relevance for Contract Law Theory and Reform’
(2001) 99 Michigan Law Review 1791.
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In addition to these formal disclosure mechanisms, there are
informal ones that facilitate the exchange of reputational information. These
informal mechanisms aim to strengthen and maintain the connection
between business relations and social relationships. Traditionally, the small
trading towns in the South constitute a community in which commercial and
social relationships are strongly intertwined and the reputation as a
businessman goes hand in hand with his social status and position. Today,
this interdependence of personal and professional reputation is actively kept
in existence. Although telephone and the Internet have replaced face-to-face
trade, Front Street in Memphis remains the regional trade centre and
constitutes a physical meeting point for traders. Traders explain, ‘Front
Street is worse than a bunch of old women’ and ‘It is like a sewing circle’.10
Also, trade associations organise or support all kinds of social events, thus
expanding social control from business life to the social circle. There is an
annual debutante ball, Memphis Mardi Gras, a Cotton Wives Club with its
own Cotton Tales magazine, and there are golf and other sports tournaments.
These events make sure that family members are actively involved in the
cotton trade community. Thus, when information about dishonest behaviour
circulates, it not only damages the economic position of a trader but also
negatively affects his social position and that of his family. The financial
consequences of breach of contract could even be perceived as less
damaging than the social consequences in terms of shame and expulsion
from the community.
2.2 The diamond trade
The American cotton trade exemplifies a market where traditional forms of
out-of-court social control have survived in modern times through an active
role of trade associations. The next case study shows that the reputation
mechanism even effectively operates as a social control mechanism in the
market for the most expensive and exclusive product on earth: diamonds. In
the New York diamond trade, social control is so powerful and efficient that
it even replaces commercial law.
Trading diamonds is a risky business. Aside from the immeasurable
value of the stones, the trade offers many other opportunities for cheaters.
Firstly, diamonds are usually traded on installment. Secondly, countless
intermediating parties and traders handle and transport the stones to inspect
and value them before they reach their final owner. And thirdly, there is a
flourishing black market for diamonds. These characteristics provide traders
with an enormous need for information about the trustworthiness of business
partners. The diamond trade is concentrated in closed communities, both in
geographic terms – Antwerp and New York are the diamond capitals of the
10 Bernstein, above n. 4 at 1752.
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world – and in socio-cultural terms: the diamond trade is traditionally the
domain of Jewish traders. In both communities, diamond traders have
established trade associations that function as platforms for the exchange of
information and for conflict resolution. In Antwerp, the Hoge Raad voor
Diamant (HRD) is the centre of the trade; in New York, it is the New York
Diamond Dealers Club (DCC), located on 47th Street in Manhattan.
Siegel characterizes the Antwerp trade as a high-trust subculture that
is closed to outsiders.11 The task of regulation and conflict resolution is not
performed by the government but by the Hoge Raad voor Diamant. This
HRD aims to protect the reputation of the diamond traders by excluding
newcomers from membership. For example, Jewish gold traders from
Georgia or Russia are not admitted to the HRD because they are associated
with organised crime in Eastern Europe. The HRD continuously stresses the
difference between the diamond trade and the supposedly mala fide gold
trade, and even has summoned the assistance of the criminal prosecutor in
order to prevent the Mafia from infiltrating into the diamond market.
Richman provides a case study of the New York diamond trade that
permits a closer understanding of the functioning of reputational
mechanisms within the diamond trade.12 The New York Diamond Dealers
Club serves several purposes. It serves as an exchange. 95 per cent of the
diamond trade in the US takes place on its 25,000 square foot trading floor;
the trade value is 30 billion dollar per year. In addition, the DCC is a traders
association and provides its members with numerous advantages. It has a
heavily secured trade room. But more relevant in the light of this article is
the fact that the DCC has the sole right to collect and disclose reputation
information. In case there is a conflict, members are obliged to resort to the
DCC’s arbitration committee. Members who bring their conflicts to court are
fined or expelled. This ensures that DCC is well informed about all non-
compliant members.
Next, DCC actively discloses this reputation information in a way
that is surprisingly simple, if we take the value of the merchandise into
consideration. One of the walls in the large trading room is used as a
members’ picture gallery and for posting all relevant information on their
reputation. Candidate members see their picture attached to the wall for a
period of ten days, during which other members can post remarks on their
reputation. The decisions of the arbitration committee are published on this
wall, which also displays the pictures of traders that have failed to pay their
debts, in a format that somewhat resembles a Wanted message. It is clear that
traders will prevent at all cost their picture from being displayed in this
manner.
11 D. Siegel, ‘De joodse gemeenschap en de Antwerpse diamantsector in historisch
perspectief’ (2002) 44 Tijdschrift voor Criminologie at 338.
12 Richman, above n. 5.
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Besides this wall, the trading floor also provides the opportunity to
physically exchange the latest news and gossip and to ask for references
about potential business partners. Thus reputation information is quickly
disseminated. And finally, we find a mixture of commercial and personal
relations: 85 to 90% of the DCC members are orthodox Jews, many traders
come from trading families, and family and community ties are strong.
2.3 The Dutch construction industry
Thus far, I have presented two examples of markets in which reputation
provides a mechanism for out of court social control that overrules legal
enforcement. Participants to these markets prefer informal enforcement
through the reputational mechanism to legal conflict resolution. However, it
cannot be denied that both markets still operate under the shadow of the law,
in the sense that criminal activity can be prosecuted. For those cases in
which out of court arbitration fails to solve appropriately, parties can always
use the law as last resort. Complete non-existence of legal social control is in
fact only the case in illegal markets. After all, criminals cannot go to court to
settle their disputes. However, even in illegal markets, reputational sanctions
are a pervasive and effective mechanism for social control, as the next case
study shows.
An excellent example of the role of reputation in illegal markets can
be found in the Dutch construction fraud.13 The Dutch construction industry
is characterised by a history of private contracting, and informal price
coordination and work distribution. This has contributed to a continuous
work flow for construction companies and thus to a stable and long-lasting
market. Nevertheless, this system of informal coordination was forbidden in
1992, when the Dutch Antitrust Act was adopted. The new legislation did
not end the system of price agreements, however. Almost all construction
companies were involved in secret pre-bidding consultation in practically
every contracting procedure. This conspiracy only came to an end after the
publication of a parliamentary investigative report, which was initiated by
the revelations of a whistle-blower. This whistle-blower, a former director of
one of the largest construction companies, published the handwritten shadow
administration he had kept for ten years. The setoffs in this administration
were related to market sharing, price fixing and mutual compensation.
The construction fraud gives rise to two questions, to both of which
the reputation mechanism provides an answer. Firstly, the scale and
operational detail of the fraud is exceptional. Almost every construction
company in the Netherlands was involved, and the system was also open for
participation to Belgian and German companies. For each construction
agency, it would have been very easy to blow the whistle and reveal the
13 Van de Bunt, above n. 6.
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secret cartel. This would no doubt have raised this company’s position in
governmental, and probably also in commercial biddings. What kept parties
from breaking the conspiracy?
The answer is the companies’ concern to uphold a reputation of
being a fair player to their business partners. Apparently, a reputation of
compliance to the law was not as important to contractors as a reputation of
reliability with their colleagues. This is because construction companies are
not only competitors but also constantly cooperate in subcontracting
relations. A construction company cannot execute a large order alone: it
needs the cooperation of reliable subcontractors. However, the incidental
company that had stepped out of the cartel found itself in a pariah position.
They were not assigned subcontracts and all kinds of obstacles were created
by the others to participating in public biddings. Not participating in pre-
tender consultation was considered to be extraordinarily non-collegial. The
construction industry is characterized by strong social ties, and the forbidden
pre-bidding gatherings were a much valued social event ‘with very nice
coffee and sandwiches’, as one of the participants remarked. Cheaters could
be sure that they would be the subject of extremely negative comments at
social meetings.
The second question is how agreements of such detail and financial
importance were enforced without legal means. It is striking that conflicts
occur relatively seldom. One mechanism of conflict prevention is the
meticulous documentation of agreements in a so-called shadow account.
Companies that passed an order on to someone else built up a claim that they
could trust to be compensated in future tender negotiations. At various times
during the year, companies came together to clear their credits and debts
with each other. Under the leadership of a retired, authoritative businessman,
they tried to settle their claims. Since the exchange of money was highly
undesirable (for risk of financial streams being discovered by the tax
authorities), claims that could not be settled were paid out in work, in goods,
or in last resort by postponing a claim to the next year.
Another factor promoting informal conflict resolution is that it pays
to have a reputation of cooperativeness. A reputation for unfairness in the
resolution of disputes that may arise in the course of transactions is held at
high cost of being passed over in future contracts. The informal pre-tender
consultations and the settlement meetings provide the occasion for the rapid
dissemination about businesses failing to comply with market-share
agreements. Because many companies have existed for several generations
and the sector is relatively small, a strong common culture and code of
honour has developed. In this shared culture, breaking a promise is
considered to be dishonourable and not-done.
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3 Characteristics of successful reputational regulation in commercial
markets
In the previous section, I have shown that reputation is a most powerful and
effective mechanism for social control. We find it successfully regulates
markets that operate under unique pressure, either because of the financial
value of the merchandise or because of their illegal nature. In these markets,
reputational sanctions replace legal sanctions, the last being either
inappropriate or unavailable.
In this section, I will analyse the characteristics of markets where
effective reputational regulation is exerted. I have identified four
characteristics of markets with successful reputational sanctions. Firstly, the
nature of the activity in these markets calls for high levels of trust. Secondly,
a broken agreement directly damages the market position of traders in these
markets. Thirdly, the markets are characterized by a small amount of
relational distance. And finally, compliance to agreements is not only valued
for reasons of self-interest, but also for moral reasons.
3.1 Absence of formal mechanisms of social control
All three cases I have presented are markets that are characterized by
information asymmetry and high transaction costs, where compensation for
breaches of trust or violations of agreements is problematic. In the market
for cotton and diamonds, legal conflict resolution is perceived as inefficient
and inadequate. In the Dutch construction industry, legal enforcement is not
available because of the illegal nature of the trade. In these asymmetric
markets, entrepreneurs preferably only interact with business partners that
have proven themselves reliable. This is of course not possible. As the
sociologist Simmel observes in his classic work on trust and social control,
Very few relationships are based entirely upon what is known with certainty about
another person, and very few relationships would endure if trust were not as strong
as, or stronger than, rational proof or personal observation.14
To avoid contractual problems arising from the difficulty of assessing the
quality of products or services or uncertainty about other people’s motives,
people rely on information about their reputations. Thus, reputation can be
seen as a simplifying device, providing efficient contractual relations.15 It is
the absence of the possibility of effective ex post enforcement through legal
conflict resolution that stimulates business partners to actively gather and
14 G. Simmel, The philosophy of money (London: Routledge 1978) at 178-179.
15 B.A. Misztal, Trust in modern societies: the search for the bases of social order
(Cambridge: Polity Press 1996) at 121-122.
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exchange reputation information. In other words, the exchange of
reputational information thrives when a need for this type of information
arises from the inefficiency or impossibility of external regulation.
3.2 Market position
A second common characteristic of markets with effective reputational
regulation is the fact that a broken agreement seriously damages the market
position of the noncompliant party, because of the reactions of third parties.
A broken agreement not only damages the relation with the business partner
involved, but with many other potential business partners as well. If
information about past transactional behavior is available to a significant
number of participants, breach of contract with one transactor will be
transformed into breach of contract with numerous market transactors as far
as a transactor’s commercial reputation is concerned. The costs of losing one
contract is multiplied by the costs of losing business opportunities with all
market parties. This multiplying effect is what makes fear for reputational
damage a strong motive for compliance in commercial relationships.16 In the
cases that I have presented, being known as an unreliable business partner
makes it impossible to acquire contracts. Reputational damage can consist of
withdrawal of support and cooperation of business partners, customers no
longer buying goods or services, or investors refraining from investment.
Reputational damage thus not only works as an ex post sanction but also
prevents non-compliance by serving as a deterrent.
It follows from this argumentation that reputational damage only
represents an effective regulatory mechanism for parties for whom a good
reputation is necessary to obtain future contracts. Companies with many
alternating business partners, end-game actors facing bankruptcy, and
monopoly actors do not depend on a good reputation.17
3.3 Relational distance
A third factor causing the reputational mechanisms in the cases described to
be so powerful is the effective dissemination of reputational information.
Information on past performance is spread both through formal publication
and through informal chat and gossip. This implies that markets in which
reputation is an effective regulatory mechanism consist of a relatively
limited number of parties that frequently exchange information on the
16 D. Charny, ‘Nonlegal sanctions in commercial relationships’ (1990) 104 Harvard
Law Review 373. Bernstein, above n. 4. Posner, above n. 2. S. Macaulay, ’Non-
contractual relations in business: a preliminary study’ (1963) 28 American
Sociological Review 55.
17 Posner, above n. 2.
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quality of products and services, and that they have close ties. In business
communities where reputational mechanisms appear to be strong, whether
they are a legal market or a market with illegal practices, we see a strong
social embeddedness of business transactions. An underperforming cotton
trader experiences the consequences of his unreliability not only in business,
but also in his private life. This is the result of the strong social ties within
the community. This type of market can be characterized as market with a
relatively short ’relational distance’.18 In close relationships, there is little
legal social control and alternative non-legal social control is very intense.
As communities grow larger and become more connected with the outside
world, the relational distance between members tends to increase and
informal sanctions are employed with decreasing frequency. Instead, the
various activities comprising social control are delegated to specialists who
perform this role full-time and exclusively.19 Although markets with strong
reputational mechanisms have institutionalised reputational sanctioning in a
trade association, these associations have the task of keeping membership
exclusive and to diminish the distance between the members by exchanging
information and organising meetings.
3.4 Morality
There are two types of reasons for parties to value their reputation. One
arises out of self-interest: the expectation that a good reputation will pay off
in terms of utilities. The other comes from moral obligation.20 In the cases
that I have presented, these two reasons are present at the same time.
Complying to agreements is a matter of long-term self-interest, but also a
matter of honour and decency. Those trying to cheat are not only excluded
from business contracts but are also morally disqualified.21 The business
relationships in the cases I have reviewed are more than just self-interested
exchange relationships. Instead, they can be characterized as fictive
friendships: obligating, public, strongly instrumental relationships, in which
scarce resources are distributed.22
Moral disapproval of norm infractions, in addition to the financial
consequences, is a powerful regulatory mechanism. Case studies show that
18 Black, above n. 1 at 45-46.
19 J. Griffiths, ‘The division of labor in social control’ in D. Black (ed.), above n. 1.
20 Misztal, above n. 15 at 127-128.
21 M. Hertogh, ‘Van naleving naar beleving van regels. Bouwwereld en Bouwfraude
vanuit een rechtssociologisch perspectief’ in T. Barkhuysen, W. den Oudsten and J.
Polak (eds.), Recht realiseren, Bijdragen rond het thema adequate naleving van
rechtsregels (Deventer: Kluwer 2005) 62.
22 S. Falk Moore, ‘Law and Social Change: The Semi-Autonomous Social Field as
an Appropriate Subject of Study’ (1973) 7 Law & Society Review 719.
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norms that have a moral element are self enforcing; external enforcement is
hardly necessary. External enforcement is not able to bring about the
emotion that is so predominant in social relations: shame. Criminologist
John Braithwaite claims that it is not the severity of the sanction in financial
terms, but the amount of public shame that it invokes which is the most
important motivator of compliance. In other words, ‘The nub of deterrence is
not the severity of the sanction but its social embeddedness’.23 Fictive
friendships are filled with mutual respect. The disappearance of this respect
is an important part of the working mechanism of a reputational sanction.
4 Reputational sanctions in public regulation: strengths and weaknesses
Public regulation of corporate behaviour in markets was long characterised
by external social control by public enforcement authorities. Increasingly,
however, regulators have come to realise that external supervision alone
cannot prevent organisational misbehaviour. Currently, regulators are
attempting to shift from classic command and control regulation to forms of
non-hierarchical regulation or governance that are more congruent with
existing mechanisms of internal social control and self regulation within
markets.24 Regulatory theories such as ‘responsive regulation’25 and ‘smart
regulation’26 have inspired this new approach. These theories advocate a mix
of regulatory instruments that make more use of the influence of consumers,
significant peers or market forces.
A manifestation of this approach is the increasing use of regulatory
disclosure, or naming and shaming, techniques, which aim to increase the
transparency of markets and to invoke reputational mechanisms. Disclosure
of inspection results is meant to better inform consumers, in the expectation
that they will weigh the compliance status of companies in their decision to
do business with a certain company. Thus, it is attempted to invoke a market
follow-up of public sanctions and to increase the impact of public sanctions
on corporate reputations.
An important reason for the increasing use of naming and shaming is
that reputational sanctions are considered more effective than traditional
23 J. Braithwaite, Crime, shame and reintegration (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press 1989) at 55.
24 H.G. van de Bunt and R. van Swaaningen, ‘Privatisering van de veiligheidszorg’
in L.W. Winkel and J.J.M. Jansen (eds.) Privatisering van veiligheid (Den Haag:
Boom Juridische uitgevers 2005) 5.
25 I. Ayres and J. Braithwaite, Responsive Regulation: Transcending the
Deregulation Debate (Oxford: Oxford University Press 1992).
26 N. Gunningham and P. Grabosky (eds.) Smart regulation, designing
environmental policy (Oxford: Oxford University Press 1998).
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sanctions in deterring regulatory offences or stimulating regulatory
compliance. A clear example of this argument is found in the Macrory
Review on effective sanctions, the report of Better Regulation Executive
professor Richard Macrory to the British Government. ‘A company’s
reputation and prestige is an important and valuable asset,’ professor
Macrory argues.
The consequences of damaging a firm’s reputation can potentially exceed the effect
of a maximum fine that a court could impose. A company that loses its reputation
even for a short time can suffer significant damages to consumer confidence, market
share and equity value. (…) The threat of this type of sanction may encourage firms
contemplating not complying with regulatory objectives to re-consider, even if the
noncompliance would generate significant financial benefit.27
The argument of consumer empowerment and regulatory effectiveness is
also found in the Dutch policy programme ‘Towards a practical legal order’,
which argues that the external pressure of stakeholders will leave public
regulation with less costs and regulatory burden, and a larger effectiveness
and public acceptance of enforcement and sanctioning.28
Academic evaluation has yet to answer the question whether naming
and shaming used by public authorities as a policy instrument can indeed
meet the expectations. There are several questions that empirical research
should address.29 Are regulators able to effectively influence reputations and
predict and control the effects? Does shaming effectively deter corporate
crime or does it have little effect or even encourage criminal behaviour? And
is there evidence that shaming changes people’s views about the harmfulness
of criminal behaviour? This article is an attempt to analyse the potential
strengths and weaknesses of naming and shaming by learning from
situations where reputational regulation is successful. In the previous
section, I have identified four conditions for reputational regulation that
account for the effectiveness of reputational regulation in commercial
markets. The next step is to analyse to what extent these conditions are
present in public regulation.
Firstly, we have seen that reputational sanctions flourish in markets
where legal enforcement is problematic. However, regulatory disclosure of
27 R.B. Macrory, Regulatory Justice: Making Sanctions Effective Final Report
(London: Marcrory Review, Cabinet Office 2006) at 83.
28 Tweede Kamer der Staten Generaal, Nota Bruikbare Rechtsorde, nr. 29279, nr. 9,
vergaderjaar 2003-2004 20-21.
29 Kahan and Posner, above nr. 3. R. Pawson, ‘Does Megan's law work? A theory-
driven systematic review’, ESRC UK Centre for Evidence Based Policy and
Practice Working Paper 8 (ESRC: UK Centre for Evidence Based Policy and
Practice 2002).
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the names of offending companies is diametrically opposed to this situation.
We must ask whether the fact that external regulation is already taking place
does not make non-legal sanctions and informal social control redundant.
For example, it is unclear what incentive European airline passengers have
to consult the European list of banned airlines, since these airlines have
already been forbidden to execute flights in the European skies. Since it is
impossible to book a flight with these airlines, disclosure of this information
seems unnecessary, at least in the form of a blacklist designed for the general
public.
Secondly, I have argued that successful reputational regulation
requires that an offence or broken agreement negatively affect a company’s
market position. However, the publication of legal offences does not always
lead to a negative evaluation by relevant parties. Legal offences often do not
damage the interests of stakeholders directly. On the contrary: public
regulation is often designed to protect those interests that do not have a clear
stakeholder. Offences of this nature do not result in a bad reputation, and in
many cases they hardly affect a company’s reputation at all. Research by the
economist Karpoff illustrates this.30 He has calculated the size of
reputational sanctions for large American companies in terms of loss of
stock value, both for financial misrepresentation and for environmental
offences. Financial misrepresentation, or ‘cooking the books’, leads to a
huge decline of stock value. The impact of legal sanctions is multiplied by
the reputational sanctions in the shape of loss of stock value of a company.
However, the case for environmental offences shows quite a different
picture. The publication of environmental offences also leads to a drop in
stock value, but this loss can be entirely accounted for by the costs of fines
and restoration of the damage. There is no extra reputational sanction:
stockholders do not value the company less for its unreliability to comply to
environmental regulations or for unethical behaviour. As long as the
environmental offence is not harmful to the quality of the products that are
delivered, business partners have no incentive to limit the demand for the
product and to impose a reputational sanction.
Many other examples illustrate that legal norms are not always
shared by stakeholders and that the publication of an offence is not a signal
for unreliability of a company or institution. A remarkable example was the
recent rush of pupils to the Islamic primary school As Siddieq in
Amsterdam. This school had just been rated as functioning poorly by the
Dutch Board of Education and was placed under a strict regime. The new
30 J.M. Karpoff, J. Lott and E. Wehrly, ‘Reputational Penalties for Environmental
Violations, Empirical Evidence’ (2005 ) 68 Journal of Law and Economics 653.
J.M. Karpoff, D. Scott Lee and G.S. Martin, ‘The Cost to Firms of Cooking the
Books’ Journal of Financial and Quantitative analysis (forthcoming) available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=652121.
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pupils’ parents were aware of this status, but attached more importance to
the Islamic character of the educational programme than to legal rules
concerning the independence of the school board. ‘The parents came to our
information evening with the inspection report in their hands’, one of the
directors remarked.31
Thirdly, successful reputational regulation can be found in markets
that are characterised by a small relational distance. The three cases I have
provided are all examples of such markets. However, it will be clear that
markets of this kind are relatively rare and that in most markets the
dissemination and exchange of information is imperfect.32 Therefore, in most
markets, reputational sanctions do not have the strong effect that they have
in the three cases that I have described. Also, reputational sanctions are
imposed by governments, which are rarely strongly socially embedded. Most
of the time, governmental agencies do not form part of a close community;
on the contrary, the size and disintegration of the community was the very
reason for outsourcing social control to specialised governmental agents.33
Finally, we have seen that reputational sanctions are the most
effective when commercial effect and moral evaluations go hand in hand.
However, most public regulation is not inflicted with morality in the same
way as social norms among fictive friends are. Public regulation is not as
widely accepted as collective rules in a business market. Offending cartel
regulations, committing tax fraud or employing illegal staff does not meet
with the same amount of social disapproval as the breaking of an agreement
with a business partner. What’s more, governmental sanctions usually do not
invoke a sense of shame. ‘The only shaming that induces shame is
disapproval of the act by those who we respect very highly,’ Braithwaite and
Drahos argue.34 It is doubtful if the public offenders indexes or registers that
are published on the Internet by many public authorities are the best way of
invoking shame. The information provided in these registers is impersonal
and the registers do not invite the circle around the offender to express their
disapproval, as the Wall of Shame in the diamond bourse does. The
publication format makes it easy to neutralise the offence and to brush aside
feelings of shame.
31 NRC Handelsblad, June 21, 2007.
32 Charny, above n. 16.
33 Griffiths, above n. 19.
34 J. Braithwaite and P. Drahos, ‘Zero Tolerance, Naming and Shaming: Is there a
case for it with crimes of the powerful?’ (2002) 35 Australian and New Zealand
Journal of Criminology 269 at 273.
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5 Concluding remarks
This article has analysed the functioning of reputation as a mechanism for
social control in private and public regulation. I have discussed three cases
of markets where reputation is a powerful and effective mechanism for
social control. We find that it successfully regulates markets that operate
under unequalled pressure, either because of the financial value of the
merchandise or because of their illegal nature. Reputational sanctions can be
so powerful and efficient that they make legal sanctions redundant. We have
seen several cases of reputational regulation taking the place of commercial
law, which sometimes is considered unsatisfying as a conflict resolution
mechanism, and in other situations is unavailable.
From the case studies, I have identified four characteristics of
markets with effective reputational sanctions. Firstly, the nature of the
activity in these markets calls for high levels of trust. Secondly, a broken
agreement directly damages the market position of traders in these markets.
Thirdly, the markets are characterised by a short relational distance. And
finally, compliance with agreements is not only valued for reasons of self-
interest but for moral reasons as well.
Reputational sanctioning is not limited to the private sphere. As a
reaction to the growing criticism of command and control regulation, and the
call for alternative types of regulation that are in better accordance with
existing mechanisms for social control, public regulators are experimenting
with reputational sanctions. Regulators expect the publication of inspection
results to affect the reputation of a company and the threat of negative
publicity to prevent companies from offending the law. However, I have
argued that the conditions that contribute to the strength of reputation as a
regulatory mechanism in private markets are often absent in the context of
public regulation. Company offences of public regulation are not always
considered a sign of unreliability. These offences are usually not heavily
damaging to the market position, social position or moral evaluation of a
company. Therefore, we should put the effectiveness of naming and shaming
by public authorities into perspective. It is highly doubtful that they will be
as effective as reputational sanctioning in commercial markets.
162 Erasmus Law Review [Volume 01 Issue 05
